Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience by Morse, Stephen J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2008 
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges 
to Responsibility from Neuroscience 
Stephen J. Morse 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Law and Psychology 
Commons, Neurology Commons, Neurosciences Commons, Psychiatry and Psychology Commons, and 
the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Morse, Stephen J., "Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility 
from Neuroscience" (2008). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 531. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/531 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO 
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36. 
 
1 
                                                          
 
Articles 
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: 
Two Challenges To Responsibility from 
Neuroscience 
Stephen J. Morse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free will and human agency are considered foundational 
for ascriptions of criminal responsibility in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  As United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes famously observed, “even a dog distinguishes 
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between being stumbled over and being kicked.”1  And, as 
Justice Jackson wrote in Morissette v. U.S., concisely noting 
both conditions: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.  It is as 
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in 
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the 
normal individual to choose between good and evil.  A relation 
between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is 
almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory “But I didn’t 
mean to”. . . .2 
Now, however, the discoveries of the new neuroscience 
challenge both foundations for responsibility.3  The new 
neuroscience seems poised to demonstrate that our behavior is 
determined by physical events in the brain and that we 
therefore cannot be responsible.  Neuroscientific discoveries 
also are alleged to demonstrate that mental states do not 
causally explain our behavior.  If this is true, it provides 
another, independent ground for the claim that responsibility is 
impossible. 
I argue that neither challenge succeeds.  The challenge to 
free will from neurophysical determinism is familiar to similar 
challenges in the past, but it fails for three reasons.  First, free 
will is not a criterion for the application of any legal rule.  
Second, free will is not foundational for criminal responsibility.  
Third, there is a philosophically plausible response to those 
who claim that determinism—whether based on the theories 
and findings of neuroscience or any other discipline—and 
responsibility are incompatible.  Thus, I conclude that, for the 
moment, the positive doctrines of legal and moral responsibility 
are normatively safe from the newest metaphysical assault.  
The neuroscientific attack on agency is more troubling because 
it claims that the presumptions of morality and the law about 
human agency are inconsistent with our new understanding of 
the link between brain and behavior.  Roughly speaking, the 
law implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the person, 
 1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (Transaction ed. 
2005) (1963). 
 2. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952). 
 3. I recognize that legal and moral responsibility need not coincide.  
Because Anglo-American punishment theory holds that desert is a necessary 
condition for punishment—at least at the core of criminal law—I shall assume 
that moral and legal responsibility do coincide in the core. 
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which explains behavior in terms of desires, beliefs and 
intentions.  If practical reason plays no role in explaining our 
behavior, as some neuroscientists and others claim, current 
responsibility doctrines and practices would have to be 
radically altered or jettisoned altogether.  I suggest, however, 
that the conceptual and scientific support for this argument is 
thin at present and that there is good ground to believe that 
our conception of persons as agents is unlikely to disappear.  
Consequently, legal and moral doctrines that depend on agentic 
personhood are secure—at least for now. 
The paper proceeds as follows: part II briefly describes the 
law’s concept of the responsible person and demonstrates that 
free will is not a criterion of legal responsibility in general and 
criminal responsibility in particular.  Thus, even if 
determinism or universal causation is a true account of the 
metaphysics of the universe, this truth cannot cast doubt 
generally on specific legal criteria.  Part III considers the 
metaphysical free will problem and shows that free will is also 
not foundational for responsibility.  Neurophysical determinism 
is akin to genetic, psychological, or sociological determinism 
and subject to the same compatibilist responses that have 
deflected earlier deterministic challenges.  In sum, 
determinism is irrelevant to positive law, even if it is true. Part 
IV addresses the allegedly disappearing person.  It reconsiders 
the folk-psychological concept of the person embedded in law 
and morality and identifies philosophical arguments and types 
of evidence that would justify abandoning the commonsense 
conception.  It then canvasses the evidence for the current 
assault on agency from neuroscience and allied disciplines and 
concludes that folk psychology is alive and well.  The person is 
most definitely visible.  Part V is a brief conclusion. 
II. THE NON-PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN LAW 
The genuine metaphysical problem about free will 
concerns, roughly, whether human beings possess the ability or 
power to act uncaused by anything other than themselves.  
Such ability is often termed libertarian freedom, contra-causal 
freedom, agent origination and the like.  But there is no such 
problem in law.  The importance of having this power or ability 
results from the controversial belief that libertarian freedom 
underwrites the possibility of holding people genuinely 
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responsible.4  Solving the free will problem would have 
profound implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, 
such as blame and punishment, but, at present, having or 
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or 
criminal law doctrine.  Law addresses problems genuinely 
related to responsibility, including consciousness, the formation 
of mental states such as intention and knowledge, the capacity 
for rationality, and compulsion, but it never addresses the 
presence or absence of free will.5  People sometimes use “free 
will” loosely to refer to genuine responsibility doctrines, but 
this distracts from the real issues and perpetuates confusion.  
The only practical free will problem in law is the confusion 
among lawyers, scientists and others who think that free will is 
a legal criterion or who speak and write as if it is. 
A. THE LEGAL VIEW OF THE PERSON 
Consciousness and action are central to the law’s view of 
the person.  The capacity for intentional activity or stillness—
the capacity for agency—is a central aspect of personhood and 
is integral to what it means to be a responsible person.  We act 
because we intend.  Responsibility judgments depend on the 
mental states that produce and accompany bodily movement 
and stillness.  This is how we think about ourselves, and this is 
the concept of the person that morality and law both reflect. 
The law’s view of the person is thus the so-called “folk-
psychological” model: a view of the person as a conscious (and 
potentially self-conscious) creature capable of practical reason, 
 4. See ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 1–
5 (2005); GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME, at viii-ix (2006); Editorial, Free 
to Choose? Modern Neuroscience Is Eroding the Idea of Free Will, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 23, 2006, at 16. 
 5. It is virtually impossible to prove a negative, but perusal of any 
American criminal code or judicial opinions will confirm the absence of 
libertarian free will as a genuine criterion.  On rare occasions, a statute might 
include the phrase.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (2007) (Consent to 
sexual activity must be “pursuant to an exercise of free will.”).  It is clear, 
however, that free will in such instances simply is a proxy for more familiar, 
less metaphysical criteria, such as the absence of compulsion.  Judges, too, 
sometimes write as if freedom of the will were a foundation for responsibility.  
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).  Such locutions 
are either unanalyzed boilerplate or once again are proxies for more familiar 
responsibility criteria.  Again, Part III infra explains why libertarian free will 
is not required for criminal responsibility. 
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an agent who forms and acts on intentions that are the product 
of the person’s desires and beliefs.  We are the sort of creatures 
that can act for and respond to reasons.  The law properly 
treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as 
mechanical forces of nature.  Law and morality are action-
guiding6 and could not guide people ex ante and ex post unless 
people could use rules as premises in their practical reasoning.  
Otherwise, law and morality as action-guiding normative 
systems of rules would be useless, and perhaps incoherent.  
Law is a system of rules that, at the least, is meant to guide or 
influence behavior and thus to operate as a potential cause of 
behavior.  As John Searle wrote, 
Once we have the possibility of explaining particular forms of human 
behavior as following rules, we have a very rich explanatory 
apparatus that differs dramatically from the explanatory apparatus 
of the natural sciences.  When we say we are following rules, we are 
accepting the notion of mental causation and the attendant notions of 
rationality and existence of norms. . . . 
. . . The content of the rule does not just describe what is happening, 
but plays a part in making it happen.7 
Legal and moral rules are not simply mechanistic causes 
that produce “reflex” compliance.  They operate within the 
domain of practical reason.  Agents are meant to and can only 
use these rules as potential reasons for action as they 
deliberate about what they should do.8  Moral and legal rules 
are thus action-guiding primarily because they provide an 
agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or 
action.  Unless people are capable of understanding and then 
using legal rules as premises in deliberation, law would be 
powerless to affect human behavior.9  People use legal rules as 
 6. SHER, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that although philosophers 
disagree about the requirements and justifications of what morality requires, 
there is widespread agreement that “the primary task of morality is to guide 
action”); John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, 49 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 33, 35 
(2002). 
 7. Searle, supra note 6, at 35. 
 8. Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 
LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000). 
 9. Id. at 131.  This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to 
guide conduct, but a contrary assumption is largely incoherent. As Shapiro 
writes: 
Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine. It is absurd because the law 
cannot be the sort of thing that is unknowable. If a system of norms 
were unknowable, then that system would not be a legal system. One 
important reason why the law must be knowable is that its function is 
to guide conduct. Id. 
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premises in the practical syllogisms that guide much human 
action.  No instinct governs how fast a person drives on the 
open highway.  However, among the various explanatory 
variables, the posted speed limit and the belief in the 
probability of suffering the consequences for exceeding it surely 
play a large role in the driver’s choice of speed.  Human 
behavior can be modified by means other than influencing 
deliberation and human beings do not always deliberate before 
they act.  Nonetheless, law operates through practical reason, 
even when we most habitually follow the legal rules.  Law can 
directly and indirectly affect the world we inhabit only by its 
influence on practical reason.10 
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must 
always reason or consistently behave rationally according to 
some pre-ordained, normative notion of rationality.  Rather, the 
law’s view is that people are capable of acting for reasons and 
are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly 
conventional, socially-constructed standards.  The type of 
rationality the law requires is the ordinary person’s common 
sense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be 
acceptable within the disciplines of economics, philosophy, 
psychology, computer science, and the like. 
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be 
praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished is the product of 
mental causation11 and, in principle, responsive to reason.  
Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do wrong and they 
cannot violate expectations about how people ought to live 
together.  Machines do not deserve praise, blame, reward, 
punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or because 
of the results they cause.  Only people, intentional agents with 
the potential to act, can violate expectations of what they owe 
each other and only people can do wrong. 
I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of precise 
action guidance. If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear 
most of the time, however, the system could not function.  Further, the 
principle of legality dictates that criminal law rules should be especially clear. 
 10. Id. at 131–32. 
 11. I do not mean to imply dualism here.  I am simply accepting the folk-
psychological view that mental states—which are fully produced by and 
realizable in the brain—play a genuinely causal role in explaining human 
behavior.  See infra Part IV. 
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B. THE GENERAL LEGAL CRITERIA FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND 
EXCUSE 
The law’s concept of responsibility follows logically from 
the nature of law itself and its concept of the person.  As a 
system of rules that guides and governs human interaction, law 
tells citizens what they may and may not do, what they must or 
must not do, what abilities are required competently to perform 
certain tasks, and what consequences will follow from their 
conduct.  If human beings were not rational creatures who 
could understand the good reasons for action, including the 
relevant facts and rules, and were not capable of conforming to 
legal requirements through intentional action or forbearance, 
the law would be powerless to affect human action.12  Legally 
responsible agents are therefore people who have the general 
capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular 
legal contexts.13  For example, they must be generally capable 
of properly using the rules as premises in practical reasoning.  
The usual legal presumption is that most adults are so capable. 
Note that the law requires possession of a general capacity 
at the time in question rather than an exercise of that capacity.  
Failure to exercise a capacity does not necessarily mean that 
one lacks that capacity.  Indeed, acting irrationally and 
foolishly is common even among people with the greatest 
capacity for rational conduct.  Under the law, if a person is 
capable of exercising the capacity for rationality if there is good 
reason to do so—as there always is when important interests 
are at stake—then that person may be held responsible even if 
she failed to exercise that capacity. 
The general capacity for rationality is not self-defining.  It 
must be understood according to some contingent, normative 
notion both of rationality and of how much capability is 
required.  For example, legal responsibility might require the 
capability of understanding the reason for an applicable rule, 
as well as the rule’s command and the consequence for failure 
to comply.  These are matters of moral, political and, 
ultimately, legal judgment, about which reasonable people 
differ.  There is no uncontroversial definition of rationality or of 
the type and amount required for responsibility in various legal 
contexts.  These are normative issues and, whatever the 
 12. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 51–63 
(1994). 
 13. Id. at 74–83. 
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outcome might be within a polity and its legal system, the 
debate is about human action—intentional behavior that is 
responsive to reasons. 
Now let us turn to the law’s excusing conditions, those 
situations in which the agent will not be held responsible and 
may be treated specially.  If the general capacity for rationality 
is the primary responsibility condition, then lack of that 
capacity is the primary excusing condition.  It explains, for 
example, why young children, some people with dementia, and 
some people with mental disorder are not held responsible, at 
least in some contexts.  Again, how much lack of capacity is 
necessary to find the agent not responsible is a normative 
moral, social, political, and ultimately legal issue.  It is not a 
scientific, medical, psychological or psychiatric issue.14 
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition, but it 
is less well-understood than lack of rational capacity.15  It is 
useful first to distinguish cases of literal and metaphorical 
compulsion.  Literal compulsion exists when the person’s bodily 
movement is a pure mechanism, the product of mechanistic 
causes and is not rationalizable by the agent’s desires, beliefs 
and intentions.16  For example, if a much stronger person pulls 
an agent’s arm and literally forces it against the head of a third 
person despite the agent’s best efforts not to move his arm, the 
movement of the arm is not the agent’s act at all.  It is not a 
product of his or her intention.  For another example, a tremor 
produced by a neurological disorder is not an action because it 
is not intentional.  Again, the movement of the arm is pure 
mechanism. 
In contrast, metaphorical compulsion exists when the 
agent acts intentionally, but in response to some hard choice 
imposed on the agent through no fault of his or her own.17  In 
cases of metaphorical compulsion, it is useful to distinguish two 
party and one party cases.  The former occurs when another 
person threatens an agent by placing him or her in a “do-it-or-
 14. Scientific or clinical evidence may help resolve legal questions, but the 
ultimate issue is always legal and not scientific or clinical. 
 15. See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2002) (addressing the difficulty with compulsion 
excuses and suggesting that most cases seeming to require such an excuse are 
better understood in terms of irrationality). 
 16. Id. at 1055–63. 
 17. Id. 
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else” situation.  For example, if a miscreant holds a gun to an 
agent’s head and threatens to kill her unless she kills another 
innocent person, it would be wrong to kill the innocent other.  If 
the agent does kill, however, the killing is fully intentional and 
a perfectly rational response to the desire to live and to the 
belief that she would otherwise be killed.  Although it would be 
wrong to kill under these circumstances, the law may decide as 
a normative matter that the act should be excused because the 
agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be 
supremely difficult for most citizens to resist. 
One party or internal compulsion cases are more difficult 
to understand. Recognize, first, that if the internally compelled 
agent is irrational, there is no need for an independent 
compulsion excuse.  Only in cases in which the agent is 
seemingly rational do we need to consider compulsion.  The 
cases that most fit this category are “disorders of desire,” such 
as addictions, paraphilias, compulsive gambling, pyromania, 
and the like.  Note again, however, that when the addict seeks 
and uses substances, when the pedophile molests a child, when 
the compulsive gambler places a bet, and when the pyromaniac 
sets a fire, the agent is acting.  She acts intentionally to satisfy 
her craving for the purpose of achieving relief, of obtaining 
pleasure, or of both.  In these cases, if the person frequently 
yields to his or her apparently very strong desires at great 
social, occupational, or legal cost to herself, the agent will often 
say that she could not help herself, that she was not in control.  
Consequently, although the agent undeniably acted in response 
to her desires, morality or the law may again hold that 
metaphorically and normatively she was compelled and should 
be excused. 
Note that none of the law’s general criteria for 
responsibility or excuse refers to free will or its absence.  Lack 
of action, lack of rationality, and compulsion all excuse, but 
none of these conditions has anything to do with libertarian 
freedom of the will.  There may be problems conceptualizing 
and evaluating the lack of rational capacity or compulsion.  
These are real problems for law, but they are not free will 
problems.  Lawyers, scientists and forensic practitioners often 
speak and write as if these are “free will” problems, as if lack of 
free will were a synonym for lack of action, lack of rational 
capacity, or compulsion.  Nevertheless, free will is doing no 
work whatsoever, independent of these genuine excusing 
conditions, and it thus threatens to confuse the issues. 
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To explore further the error of believing that there is a 
genuine and independent free will problem in positive law, let 
us turn specifically to criminal responsibility, which is the legal 
context in which talk of free will is probably most common (and 
most distracting). 
C. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Current common law holds an agent prima facie criminally 
responsible if the agent acts intentionally and with the 
appropriate mental state, the mens rea, required by the 
definition of the offense, such as purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence.  Criminal law typically defines an 
act as an intentional bodily movement performed by an agent 
whose consciousness is reasonably intact.  Mental states have 
their ordinary language, common sense meanings.  No degree 
of commitment or rationality is included in the definitions of 
mens rea.  An act committed ambivalently for irrational 
reasons is considered intentional if it was done on purpose.  
Even if the agent is fully prima facie responsible, however, the 
agent ultimately may still not be criminally responsible if an 
excusing condition, an affirmative defense, such as legal 
insanity (essentially a rationality defect) or duress (a 
compelling “hard choice” situation, such as a “do-it-or-else” 
threat at gunpoint) was present when the agent committed the 
offense.  Although one might quibble about details, and there is 
substantial variation across jurisdictions, this account 
accurately reflects Anglo-American law’s current, core 
conception of criminal responsibility.18 
The logic of the foregoing account is that a defendant who 
wants to avoid imputation of criminal responsibility must 
create reasonable doubt about whether he or she acted 
intentionally, consciously, and with the required mens rea, or 
the defendant must establish an affirmative defense.19  If the 
 18. Any good treatise will bear out this claim.  See, e.g., JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2006). 
 19. I use the vague locution, “establish an affirmative defense,” because 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the burden of persuasion for 
affirmative defenses may be placed on the defendant.  See, e.g., Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (permitting shifting the persuasion burden 
for legal insanity to the defendant); Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 
2442 (2006) (permitting shifting the persuasion burden for duress to the 
defendant).  The defendant will effectively retain the production burden, 
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agent does not act at all because the bodily movement was not 
intentional or the agent’s consciousness was substantially 
compromised, the agent is not prima facie responsible.  For 
example, a reflex or behavior in an altered state of 
consciousness, such as sleepwalking, will not be considered the 
defendant’s action, even if the defendant’s bodily movements 
caused a harm.20  An agent who does not act is acquitted 
outright.  Similarly, if the agent lacks a requisite mental state, 
the agent is also not prima facie criminally responsible and 
must be acquitted outright of the crime requiring that mental 
state.  For example, suppose a defendant shoots a creature he 
actually believes to be a space alien impersonating a police 
officer, but the victim turns out to be a genuine police officer.  
The shooting was an intentional action, but the defendant 
cannot be convicted of intentional homicide of a person knowing 
that the victim was a police office because he did not intend to 
kill a human being and did not know the victim was a police 
officer.21  If he or she was sufficiently careless, however, the 
defendant might be convicted of negligent homicide, defined as 
killing in a situation in which a reasonable person should have 
recognized that his or her conduct created a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death to a human being.22 
Like the definitions of crimes, affirmative defenses also 
have specific criteria.  Consider first the insanity defense, using 
the Model Penal Code test as an example.  To be found legally 
insane, at the time of the crime the defendant must have been 
suffering from a mental disorder and, as a result, lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his action 
or to conform his action to the requirements of the law.23  Thus, 
if the defendant is not sufficiently disordered to meet the law’s 
definition of mental disorder, or did not lack the requisite 
substantial capacity, a legal insanity defense will fail.  Now, 
consider the Model Penal Code standard for the affirmative 
defense of duress.  Duress is established if the defendant is 
threatened with unlawful force—usually death or grievous 
bodily harm—against his person unless he harms another, and 
however, whether or not the state shifts the persuasion burden. 
 20. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 95. 
 21. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2717–18 (2006) (stating that 
Defendant Clark claimed that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and 
held these beliefs). 
 22. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 583–84. 
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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a person of reasonable firmness would have yielded in this 
situation.24  The defense will fail if the threat was of lesser 
force or a threat to destroy only the defendant’s valued 
property, or if a person of reasonable firmness would not have 
yielded, say, killing five people to save one’s own life. 
To establish prima facie guilt or to defeat an affirmative 
defense, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant had 
free will.  To defeat the prosecution’s prima facie case, the 
defendant must simply cast reasonable doubt on the elements 
of conscious, intentional action and mens rea.  To establish an 
affirmative defense, the defense must introduce sufficient 
evidence of the criteria for the defense.  To avoid criminal 
responsibility either by negating the prosecution’s prima facie 
case or by establishing an affirmative defense, the defendant 
need not demonstrate that he or she lacked free will.  People 
often say that a defendant who acted under duress or who was 
legally insane lacked free will.  In such cases, however, free will 
is simply a confusing and conclusory way to say that the 
genuine legal criteria for excuse were met.  Lack of free will, 
independent of the behavioral legal criteria for excuse, does not 
explain why such a defendant is excused. 
For a final confirmation of the thesis that free will plays no 
role in the positive criteria for criminal responsibility, consider 
the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Clark v. 
Arizona, in which the Supreme Court had a rare opportunity to 
clarify the relation between mens rea and insanity.25  The 
questions presented were whether Arizona’s unusually narrow 
insanity defense test, which asked only if the defendant could 
distinguish between right and wrong, violated substantive due 
process rights and whether an Arizona rule that excluded 
virtually all expert evidence concerning mental disorder offered 
for the purpose of negating mens rea violated procedural due 
process.26  Legal insanity and the presence of mens rea are 
probably the criminal law issues to which free will is allegedly 
most relevant, and there was extensive discussion of the 
history of legal insanity and of the role of mens rea.27  
Nevertheless, the Court mentions the term “free will” only 
 24. Id. § 2.09(1). 
 25. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). 
 26. Id. at 2716. 
 27. Id. at 2720–22, 2724–26. 
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once, and only then because it is included in a quotation from 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Insanity Defense Work 
Group, which claimed that psychiatrists who give ultimate 
opinions about legal or moral constructs such as free will 
exceed their expertise and are likely to confuse juries.28  
Libertarian free will as a criterion of or foundation for criminal 
responsibility was not discussed.  There were many problems 
with the Court’s analysis,29 but failure to discuss free will was 
not among them. 
In short, free will or lack of it is not a criterion for criminal 
responsibility or non-responsibility.  Once again, it is irrelevant 
to the actual practice of criminal law.  It is true that people, 
including judges, practicing lawyers and a few law professors, 
talk as if free will were important in criminal law, but this is 
clearly wrong as a matter of positive law.  They sometimes 
mean, however, that free will is a necessary foundational 
justification for responsibility, even if it is not a discrete 
criterion for any legal doctrine.  The next part of this article, 
which discusses the metaphysical free will problem, 
demonstrates that having libertarian free will is not necessary 
to justify responsibility doctrines and practices according to an 
entirely plausible and practical resolution of the metaphysical 
free will problem. 
III. THE GENUINE FREE WILL PROBLEM AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Many people believe that libertarianism is a foundational 
assumption for law.  They believe that responsibility is possible 
only if we genuinely possess contra-causal freedom.  Thus, if we 
do not have this extraordinary capacity, they fear that many 
legal doctrines and practices, especially those relating to 
responsibility, may be entirely incoherent.  As we shall see, 
however, metaphysical libertarianism is not a necessary 
support for current responsibility doctrines and practices. 
Only a small number of philosophers and scientists believe 
that human beings possess libertarian freedom of action and 
will, which has been termed a “panicky” metaphysics30 because 
 28. Id. at 2736. 
 29. Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between 
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
(forthcoming 2008). 
 30. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59, 80 (G. 
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it is so implausible.31  Most philosophers and scientists believe 
that the universe is deterministic or universally caused, or 
nearly so, especially above the sub-atomic level.  There is no 
uncontroversial definition of determinism and we will never be 
able to confirm that it is true or not.  As a working definition, 
however, let us assume, roughly, that all events have causes 
that operate according to the physical laws of the universe and 
that were themselves caused by those same laws operating on 
prior states of the universe in a continuous thread of causation 
going back to the first state. 
Even if this assumption is too strong, the universe seems 
so sufficiently regular and lawful that rationality demands that 
we must adopt the hypothesis that universal causation is 
approximately correct.32  If determinism is true, the people we 
are and the actions we perform have been caused by a chain of 
causation over which we mostly had no rational control and for 
which we could not possibly be responsible.  People do not have 
contra-causal freedom.  How can responsibility be possible for 
action or for anything else in such a universe?  How can it be 
rational and fair for civil and criminal law to hold anyone 
accountable for anything, including blaming and punishing 
people because they allegedly deserve it? 
It is important to understand that, for the determinist, 
biological causes, including those arising from the brain, pose 
no new or more powerful general metaphysical challenge to 
responsibility than non-biological or social causes.  As a 
conceptual and empirical matter, humans do not necessarily 
have more control over psychological or social causal variables 
than over biological causal variables.  More important, in a 
world of universal causation or determinism, biological 
causation creates no greater threat to a person’s life hopes than 
psychological or social causation.  For purposes of the 
metaphysical free will debate, a cause is just a cause, whether 
it is neurological, genetic, psychological, sociological, or 
astrological.  Neuroscience is simply the newest “bogey” in a 
dispute about the general possibility of responsibility that has 
Watson ed., 1982). 
 31. HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 42–51 (1998). 
 32. Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of 
Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3, 12 (1989) (terming this hypothesis the “realism 
constraint”). 
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been ongoing for millennia.  Though it is more scientifically 
respectable than earlier bogeys, such as astrology and 
psychoanalysis, and appears to produce very compelling 
graphic representations of the brain,33 neuroscience evidence 
for causation does no more work in the general free 
will/responsibility debate than other kinds of causal evidence. 
No analysis of the determinism/responsibility problem 
could conceivably persuade everyone. There are no decisive, 
analytically incontrovertible arguments to resolve the 
metaphysical question.  Moreover, the question is 
metaphysical, not scientific.  Indeed, the debate is so fraught 
that even theorists who adopt the same general approach to the 
metaphysical challenge substantially disagree.  Nevertheless, 
as I shall argue, compatibilism is a plausible metaphysical 
 33. These brain graphics are almost always misleading to those who do 
not understand how they are constructed.  We have long become accustomed 
to seeing in the media and elsewhere what appear to be pictures of the brain 
with various superimposed shaded areas (which can be in any color the 
investigator wishes), indicating which region was activated by the stimulus 
presented.  These are not pictures of the brain, however, and they do not 
necessarily reflect the activity in any individual brain.  The underlying brain 
image is a “standardized” brain structure, whereas we know that there is 
enormous variation in the structure of individual brains, much as there is 
enormous variation in all the biological structures of the body.  The 
superimposed shaded areas indicate that in that region there was a change in 
activity from base rate activity, but the activity being measured is not neural 
activity.  Rather, the shading discloses (with a short time lag) changes in blood 
oxygenation, which is thought to be a good proxy for neural activation in that 
area.  Finally, the shaded areas do not show actual activity.  Instead, they are 
computer generated statistical postdictions of the likelihood that the change 
was produced by the stimuli rather than by a random fluctuation in activity 
level.  In a sense, these images are pictorial representations of a confidence 
interval, and they represent an average that may not be the true value for any 
individual subject in the study.  See CHRIS FRITH, MAKING UP THE MIND: HOW 
THE BRAIN CREATES OUR MENTAL WORLD 116–17 fig.CP2 (2007). 
  It is also the case that when a claim is allegedly backed by brain 
imaging evidence, non-experts rate the scientific reasoning supporting the 
claim to be superior to such reasoning based on equally persuasive evidence of 
other sorts.  David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The 
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Cognition).  Moreover,  non-experts are 
more likely to believe the claim even if the neuroscience is actually irrelevant 
to the logic of the explanation.  Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive 
Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1, 6 (2008).  
Much of this misunderstanding has been attributed to misleading reports of 
neuroscience in the media.  Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI. 159, 159–60 (2005).  See infra text accompanying 
notes 56–61 for a more recent example. 
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contender in the debate and thus we are warranted in thinking 
that determinism is not inconsistent with facts about human 
behavior we have reason to believe and with legal and moral 
practices we adopt in light of those facts. 
A. HARD DETERMINISM 
Hard determinism holds that free will and determinism 
are inconsistent, that free will is necessary for moral 
responsibility, that determinism is true, and therefore that no 
one can be morally responsible for one’s actions.34  This theory 
does not try either to explain or to justify our responsibility 
concepts and practices.  It simply assumes that genuine 
responsibility is metaphysically unjustified.  For example, a 
central hard determinist argument is that people can be 
responsible only if they could have acted otherwise than they 
did, but they could not have acted differently if determinism is 
true.35  Consequently, the hard determinist claims that even if 
an internally coherent account of responsibility and related 
practices can be given, it will be a superficial basis for 
responsibility, which is only an illusion.36  There is no real or 
ultimate responsibility.  Hard determinists properly concede 
that western systems of law and morality hold some people 
accountable and excuse some people, but they argue there is no 
genuinely justifiable basis for distinguishing responsible from 
non-responsible people.  Hard determinism thus provides an 
external critique of responsibility.  If determinism is true and is 
genuinely inconsistent with responsibility, then no one can ever 
be “really” or “ultimately” responsible for anything and 
responsibility attributions cannot properly justify further 
action.  The question, then, is whether as rational agents we 
must swallow our pride, accept hard determinism because it is 
so self-evidently true and somehow transform the legal system 
and our moral practices accordingly. 
 34. SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION 4 (2000). 
 35. This is sometimes called the “principle of alternate possibilities.”  It 
has generated endless disputes between incompatibilists, who believe it is 
flatly inconsistent with responsibility, and compatibilists, who believe that it 
is not inconsistent with responsibility.  See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 115–
17, 251–65. 
 36. See SMILANSKY, supra note 34, at 40–73, 145–219 (arguing that free 
will is an illusion, but an illusion that is indispensable). 
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B. COMPATIBILISM 
Compatibilists, who agree with incompatibilist hard 
determinists that determinism is true, have three basic 
answers to the incompatibilist challenge.  First, they claim that 
responsibility attributions and related practices are human 
activities constructed by us for good reason and that they need 
not conform to any ultimate metaphysical facts about genuine 
or “ultimate” responsibility.37  Indeed, some compatibilists 
deny that conforming to ultimate metaphysical facts is even a 
coherent goal in this context.38  Second, compatibilism holds 
that positive doctrines of responsibility are fully consistent with 
determinism.39  Third, compatibilists believe that responsibility 
doctrines and practices are normatively desirable and 
consistent with moral, legal, and political theories that we 
firmly embrace.40  The first claim is theoretical; the third is 
primarily normative.  There are very powerful arguments for 
the first and third claims.  For the present purpose, however, 
which is addressed to whether free will is foundational for law, 
the second claim is the most important. 
Let us begin with the most general responsibility and 
excusing conditions.  Recall that the capacity for rationality is 
the primary responsibility criterion and its lack is the primary 
excusing condition.  Human beings have different capacities for 
rationality in general and in specific contexts.  For example, 
young children in general have less developed rational capacity 
than adults.  It is also true that rationality differences affect 
agents’ capacity to grasp and to be guided by good reason.  
Differences in rational capacity and its effects are real even if 
determinism is true.41  Compulsion is also an excusing 
condition, but it is simply another fact about human beings 
that some people act in response to external or internal hard 
choice threats to which persons of reasonable firmness might 
yield and most people, most of the time, are not in such 
situations when they act.  This is true even if determinism is 
true and even if people could not have acted otherwise. 
 37. Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 438–39. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 440–42. 
 40. Id. at 443–44; see James Lenman, Compatibilism and Contractualism: 
The Possibility of Moral Responsibility, 117 ETHICS 7 (2006). 
 41. See Morse, supra note 37, at 441. 
MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO 
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36.  
18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:1 
 
                                                          
 
For a specific example, consider again the doctrines of 
criminal responsibility.  Assume that the defendant has caused 
a prohibited harm.  Prima facie responsibility requires that the 
defendant’s behavior was an act and performed with a requisite 
mental state.  Now it is true that some bodily movements are 
intentional and performed in a state of reasonably integrated 
consciousness and some are not.  It is also true that some 
defendants possess the requisite mental state and some do not.  
The truth of determinism does not entail that actions are 
indistinguishable from non-actions or that different mental 
states may accompany action.  These facts are true and make a 
perfectly rational legal difference even if determinism is true.  
Determinism is fully consistent with prima facie guilt and 
innocence. 
Now consider the defenses of insanity and duress.  Some 
people with mental disorders do not know right from wrong; 
others do.  In cases of potential duress, some people face a hard 
choice that a person of reasonable firmness would yield to and 
most people do not.  Once again, these differences make perfect 
sense according to dominant retributive and consequential 
theories of punishment.  A causal account can explain how 
these variations were caused to occur, but it does not mean that 
these variations do not exist.  Determinism is fully consistent 
with both the presence and absence of affirmative defenses.  In 
sum, the legal criteria used to identify which defendants are 
criminally responsible map onto real behavioral differences 
that justify differential legal responses. 
In their widely-noted paper, Joshua Greene and Jonathan 
Cohen take issue with the foregoing account of the positive 
foundations of legal responsibility and with my claim that it is 
the “fundamental psycholegal error” to claim that causation of 
behavior is per se an excusing condition for that behavior.42  
They suggest that, despite the law’s official position, most 
people hold a dualistic, libertarian view of the necessary 
conditions for responsibility because “vivid scientific 
information about the causes of criminal behaviour leads 
people to doubt certain individuals’ capacity for moral and legal 
 42. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience 
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1778 (2004). 
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responsibility . . . .”43  To prove their point, they use the 
hypothetical of “Mr. Puppet,” a person who has been genetically 
and environmentally engineered to be a very specific type of 
person.44  They correctly point out that Mr. Puppet is no 
different from any other person accused of a crime,45 say, an 
identical person I shall call Mr. Puppet2, who became the same 
sort of person without intentional intervention.  Yet most 
people might believe that Mr. Puppet is not responsible.  If so, 
should Mr. Puppet2 also not be responsible because he is also a 
product of a gene/environment interaction?  Would it not then 
follow, as Greene and Cohen claim, that no one is responsible? 
Green and Cohen are right about ordinary peoples’ 
intuitions, of course, but people make the fundamental psycho-
legal error all the time.  This is a sociological observation and 
not a justification for thinking causation or determinism does 
or should excuse behavior.  After all, if causation were an 
excusing condition in a world of universal causation, no one 
could ever be responsible.  This theory is inconsistent with the 
positive doctrines and practices of law and morality.  Moreover, 
if Mr. Puppet and Mr. Puppet2 are both rational agents, my 
argument suggests that they are both justifiably held 
responsible.  The lure of purely mechanistic thinking about 
behavior when causes are discovered is powerful, but should be 
resisted.  
At present, the law’s “official” position—that conscious, 
intentional, rational and uncompelled agents may properly be 
held responsible—is justified unless and until neuroscience or 
any other discipline demonstrates convincingly that humans 
are not the creatures we think we are.  That is, if humans are 
not conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons 
that play a causal role in our behavior, then the foundational 
facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken.46  If it is true, 
for example, that we are all automata, then no one is an agent, 
no one is acting and, therefore, no one can be responsible for 
action. This challenge, which is powerfully fueled by stunning 
advances in neuroscience, is empirical and in principle capable 
of resolution. Let us therefore turn to the problem of the 
 43. Id. at 1776, 1779. 
 44. Id. at 1780. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Greene and Cohen make this claim as well, which I discuss in Part IV 
infra.  See Greene & Cohen, supra note 42, at 1784. 
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allegedly “disappearing person.” 
IV. THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
DISAPPEARING PERSON 
Criminal law’s view and the ordinary, common-sense view 
of action is that it is performed by an agent or person who acts 
for reasons that cause and explain the agent’s conduct.  
Whether one explains action causally or holistically, the theory 
of action presupposes that it is a person that acts based on the 
person’s desires, beliefs, and intentions.47  Agents are praised 
and blamed, rewarded and punished.  Because it is an agent 
who acts, it makes sense to ask that person to give an account 
of his or her behavior and to be held accountable.  Asking a 
creature or a mechanistic force that does not act to answer to 
charges does not make sense.  The core of agency as the 
capacity to act for reasons is accepted as foundational for 
responsibility.  In this Part, I first address the conceptual and 
speculative issues concerning agency, then I consider the 
empirical evidence for thinking that we are not agents. Next, I 
turn to the implications of potentially accepting the death of 
folk psychology.  I conclude that there is little reason at present 
to believe that we are not agents. 
A. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
The law’s fundamental presuppositions about personhood 
and action are open to profound objection.  Most 
fundamentally, action and consciousness are scientific and 
conceptual mysteries.48  We do not know how the brain enables 
the mind49 and we do not know how action is possible.  At most 
we have hypotheses or a priori arguments.  Moreover, 
causation by mental states seems to depend on now largely 
discredited mind-brain dualism that treats minds and brains as 
separate entities that are somehow in communication with one 
 47. See ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION AND REASON 109–78 (1993). 
 48. See id. at 1–4 (describing the “basic philosophical divisions” in each of 
the four major problem areas in action theory); COLIN MCGINN, THE 
MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD (1999) 
(describing the immense difficulty of explaining consciousness and doubting 
the ability of human beings to do so). 
 49. PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF 
PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d ed. 1998). 
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another.50  How can such tenuously understood concepts be 
justifiable premises for legal practices such as blaming and 
punishing?  If our picture of ourselves is wrong, as many 
neuroscientists claim, then our responsibility practices are 
morally unjustified according to any moral theory we currently 
embrace. 
What if agency and folk psychology are an illusion?  What 
if all of the contending conceptions depend on a mistake about 
human activity?  What if, for example, reasons for actions and 
intentions, agents’ conscious understandings of their world and 
themselves do not explain actions but are simply post-hoc 
rationalizations that “make sense of ” the bodily motions or 
non-motions that brains produce?  Some people, including 
many psychologists and neuroscientists, think that new 
discoveries about the causation of behavior are leading 
inexorably to a purely mechanistic view of the link between the 
brain and behavior, and thus to a purely mechanistic view of 
human behavior.  The assassin did not shoot that gun; it was 
his finger that pulled the trigger, his peripheral neurons that 
caused his finger muscles to contract, central neurons that 
caused the peripheral neurons to fire, and so on.  The assassin’s 
desires, beliefs, and intentions did no genuine work in 
explaining his action.  These are the thoughts that terrify many 
thinking people about scientific advances in the understanding 
of human behavior.  This is a real challenge. 
Many investigators in psychology and the neurosciences 
increasingly assert the challenge to agency.  The seriousness of 
science’s potential challenge to the traditional foundations of 
law and morality is best summed up in the title of an eminent 
psychologist’s recent book, The Illusion of Conscious Will.51  
Here is an extensive quotation from the conclusion, which is 
necessary to obtain the tenor of the assertion and to evaluate if 
it is internally logical: 
 50. It is almost impossible not to talk “dualistically” in ordinary speech 
and writing.  Every time a monist neuroscientist uses a personal pronoun in 
speaking or writing, for example, he seems to imply that there is a genuine 
him that is somehow distinguishable from his brain activity.  This does not 
mean, however, that the neuroscientist (or anyone else) is really a crypto-
dualist.  It is simply an inevitable feature of current language, and perhaps it 
always will be. 
 51. DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002); see 
also Daniel M. Wegner, Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 649 (2004).  The précis is followed by open peer commentaries and 
a response from Professor Wegner. 
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Sometimes how things seem is more important than what they are.  
This is true in theater, in art, in used car sales, in economics, and—it 
now turns out—in the scientific analysis of conscious will.  The fact is, 
it seems to each of us that we have conscious will.  It seems we have 
selves.  It seems we have minds.  It seems we are agents.  It seems we 
cause what we do.  Although it is sobering and ultimately accurate to 
call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the illusory is 
trivial.  On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent mental 
causation are the building blocks of human psychology and social life.  
It is only with the feeling of conscious will that we can begin to solve 
the problems of knowing who we are as individuals, of discerning 
what we can and cannot do, and of judging ourselves morally right or 
wrong for what we have done.52 
Alternatively, to take another example from Greene and 
Cohen, suppose that “neuroscience holds the promise of turning 
the black box of the mind into a transparent bottleneck.”53  
They mean that the brain is the final mechanistic pathway 
through which all types of explanations of behavior must 
ultimately operate and that neuroscience will be able to 
demonstrate that brain mechanisms, not mental states, are 
doing all the work.54  They speculate that we may someday 
possess “extremely high-resolution scanners that can 
simultaneously track the neural activity and connectivity of 
every neuron in the human brain” and, that with the help of 
computers and software, can help people see the neural events 
that are alone causally responsible for their behavior.55  If such 
mechanistic understanding and knowledge were available and 
widespread, Greene and Cohen are probably correct that 
notions of responsibility would wither away because most 
would believe that it was the brain that “did it,” not the agent, 
and we do no
This picture of human activity exerts a strong pull on the 
 52. WEGNER, supra note 51, at 341–42.  In more recent work, Professor 
Wegner appears to have softened the radical interpretation of his claim, which 
is that we, as persons, as agents, are not really “controllers” whose mental 
processes cause action.  Daniel M. Wegner, Who is the Controller of Controlled 
Processes?, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 19, 32 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2005) 
(“This theory is mute on whether thought does cause action.”). On the other 
hand, Professor Wegner seems ambivalent and loathes fully giving up the 
radical interpretation.  See id. at 27 (arguing that the “experience of conscious 
will is normally a construction” and referring to mental causation as 
“apparent”). This apparent ambivalence is present in the work of others. 
 53. Greene & Cohen, supra note 42, at 1781. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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popular, educated imagination as well as on the theorizing of 
scientists.  Consider the following example.  In an ingenious 
recent study,56 investigators were able to predict accurately 
based on which part of the brain was physiologically active 
whether a shopper-subject would or would not make a 
purchase.  Activity in these regions predicted immediately 
subsequent purchases “above and beyond self-report 
variables.”57  As we shall see in the next sub-section, this does 
not mean that the person’s weighing of preferences and prices 
and the final decision played no role.  Activity in the nucleus 
accumbens, the insula, and the mesial prefrontal cortex is not 
“weighing” and “deciding.”  The latter are the activities of 
people, not brains.58  The findings interestingly, although 
unsurprisingly, suggest, however, that specific brain regions 
play a crucial role in particular types of psychological 
processes. 
This study was reported in the Science Times section of the 
New York Times by John Tierney.59  Here is how the story was 
“spun,” beginning with its title: Findings: The Voices in My 
Head Say “Buy It!” Why Argue?  The shopper is simply the 
hapless puppet of brain processes and plays no role as an agent 
in the purchase process.  The decision is not up to the shopper; 
it is up to his or her brain.  The conclusion considers how the 
study might help us deal with feckless consumerism. 
You might remove the pleasure of shopping by somehow dulling the 
brain’s dopamine receptors so that not even the new Apple iPhone 
would get a rise in the nucleus accumbens, but try getting anyone to 
stay on that medication.  Better the occasional jolt of pain.  Charge it 
to the insula.60 
In addition to getting the study wrong—insula activation 
was associated with excessive prices and the decision not to 
 56. Brian Knutson et al., Neural Predictors of Purchases, 53 NEURON 147 
(2007). 
 57. Id. at 147. 
 58. M.R. Bennett & P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience: An Excerpt from Chapter 3, in NEUROSCIENCE & PHILOSOPHY: 
BRAIN, MIND & LANGUAGE 15, 18–23 (Maxwell Bennett et al. eds., 2007) 
(describing ascription of psychological attributes to the brain as “senseless”).  
But see, Daniel Dennett, Philosophy as Naive Anthropology: Comment on 
Bennett and Hacker, in NEUROSCIENCE & PHILOSOPHY: BRAIN, MIND & 
LANGUAGE, supra at 73, 86–88 (claiming that it makes sense to attribute 
“attenuated” sorts of psychological attributes to parts of the brain). 
 59. John Tierney, Findings: The Voices in My Head Say “Buy It!” Why 
Argue?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at F1. 
 60. Id. 
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purchase61—it betrays once again the mechanistic view of 
human activity.  What people do is simply a product of brain 
regions and neurotransmitters.  The person disappears.  There 
is no shopper.  There is only a brain in a mall. 
If accounts such as these from both scientists and the 
media are correct and their implications were properly 
understood, rationality would require either that we abandon 
agency-based conceptions and practices of responsibility or that 
we learn to live with the illusion that we are agents.  The rich 
explanatory apparatus of intentionality is simply a post-hoc 
rationalization we hapless homo sapiens construct to explain 
what our brains have already done.  We are just mechanisms, 
although the illusion of conscious will may play a positive role 
in our lives.62  Let us call this the “No Action Thesis” (NAT). 
If these doubts about folk psychology and agency are 
accurate, compatibilism cannot save responsibility because 
determinism is consistent with either of two inconsistent views 
of human behavior.  The truth of determinism is consistent 
with the existence or non-existence of agency, with the causal 
role or non-causal role of mental states in explaining behavior. 
Responsibility depends on agency, on the causal role of mental 
states, and the new discoveries arguably deny the possibility of 
agency as it is traditionally conceived. 
Before turning to the actual evidence for NAT, let us 
consider some conceptual difficulties, using Greene and Cohen’s 
“transparent bottleneck” argument.  I will assume that the 
scanning and computing abilities that the argument employs 
are possible, although the brain has 1011 cells and at least 1015 
connections.63  The real problem with the argument is not that 
 61. Id. 
 62. This claim should not be confused with the apparently similar claim 
that “personhood” is an illusion.  See Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein, 
Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 
37, 40 (2007) (claiming that our construct of “personhood” is simply the 
illusory product of innate and automatic brain systems that is “projected” onto 
the world).  There are many problems with the logic of this claim, but even if it 
is correct, it does not deny that creatures like us have mental states, such as 
desires and beliefs, that can be causally explanatory.  Most charitably 
interpreted, it simply denies the explanatory usefulness of the normative 
concept of a “person.” 
 63. Is it really likely, however, that the computer would predict what 
precise sentences we would speak?  At present, of course, the speculation is 
pure science fiction and, in my opinion, is likely to remain so. 
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it assumes a (barely) plausible computational ability, but that 
it appears to assume the validity of a complete reduction of 
mind to mental states at the level of (apparently) neural 
networks.  Such reductivism is controversial, however, even 
among monists who believe that the brain produces the mind, 
which is realizable in the brain.64  Indeed, the complete post-
Enlightenment project of reducing all phenomena to the most 
basic physical building blocks is also controversial and almost 
certainly a chimera.  Until we have the science to demonstrate 
that such reduction is possible and that it is the best 
explanation of mental states, there is no reason to foresee the 
end of responsibility. 
It is possible, of course, that our ability to predict behavior 
using new neuroscience techniques may become so successful 
that we will abandon responsibility concepts and practices not 
because responsibility is impossible, but because the 
consequential attractions of the potential for social engineering 
are so great.  In this sense, the practical use of responsibility 
practices may hang by a technological thread.65  But this is 
distinguishable from abandoning responsibility because we are 
not agents.  After all, much of our behavior much of the time is 
predictable—such as being polite at professional meetings—but 
this does not mean we are not responsible for such predictable 
behavior.  It is also possible that when we do discover how the 
brain enables the mind (assuming that this is possible) it will 
so profoundly alter our understanding of ourselves as biological 
creatures that all moral and political notions will change.66  
Nevertheless, this argument is different from claiming that we 
are not agents, that our mental states do no explanatory work. 
B. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE “NO ACTION THESIS” 
The real NAT question is whether scientific and clinical 
 64.  See Carl F. Craver, Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield 
Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience, 36 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL 
& BIOMEDICAL SCI. 373, 375 (2005) (claiming that reduction models have 
“shortcomings” and that non-reductive physicalism is now a “standard view in 
the philosophy of mind”).  
 65. Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 
294–303 (1999). 
 66. See CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE 
MOSAIC UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2007) (suggesting that if mysteries such as 
consciousness are solved, “[I]t will revise our self-conception as radically as . . . 
Darwin’s humbling of our origins.”). 
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investigations have shown that action is rare or non-existent; 
that conscious will is largely or entirely an illusion.  Four kinds 
of indirect evidence are often adduced: first, demonstrations 
that a very large part of our activity is undeniably caused by 
variables we are not in the slightest aware of; second, studies 
indicating that more activity than we think takes place when 
our consciousness is divided or diminished; third, laboratory 
studies that show that people can be experimentally misled 
about their causal contribution to their apparent behavior; and, 
fourth, evidence that particular types of psychological processes 
seem to have their biological substrate in specific regions of the 
brain.  None of these types of evidence offers logical support to 
NAT, however. 
Just because a person may not be aware of all the causes 
for why he formed an intention does not mean that he did not 
form an intention, that he was not a fully conscious agent when 
he did so, and that his intention played no causal role in 
explaining the person’s behavior.  Even if human beings were 
never aware of the causes of their intentions to act and of their 
actions, it would not necessarily follow that they were not 
acting consciously, intentionally and for reasons that make 
eminent sense to anyone under the circumstances. 
Human consciousness can undeniably be divided or 
diminished by a wide variety of normal and abnormal causes.67  
We have known this long before contemporary scientific 
discoveries of what causes such states and how they correlate 
with brain structure and processes.  Law and morality agree 
that if an agent’s capacity for consciousness is non-culpably 
diminished, responsibility is likewise diminished.  Some 
suggest that it is diminished because bodily movements in the 
absence of fully integrated consciousness are not “actions.”68  
Others believe that apparently goal-directed behavior that is 
responsive to the environment, such as sleepwalking, is action, 
 67. See JEFFREY L. CUMMINGS & MICHAEL S. MEGA, NEUROPSYCHIATRY 
AND BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 333–43 (2003) (description of dissociative 
and related states and their causes and treatments); D. Vaitl, et al., 
Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness, 131  PSYCHOL. BULL. 98 
(2005). 
 68. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 49–52, 135–155, 257–58 
(1993) (arguing that cases of compromised consciousness should be treated as 
non-action); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1749, 1804–20 (1994). 
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but that it should be excused because diminished consciousness 
reduces the capacity for rationality.69  Let us assume that the 
former view is correct, because it offers more direct support to 
NAT and therefore the greatest challenge to traditional notions 
of individual responsibility.  Let us also assume that divided or 
diminished consciousness is more common than it appears to 
be.  Nevertheless, neither of these assumptions supports the 
more radical, general NAT thesis. 
Demonstrating that divided or partial consciousness is 
more common than it appears certainly extends the range of 
cases in which people are not responsible or have diminished 
responsibility.  Such studies do not demonstrate, however, that 
most human bodily movements that appear intentional and 
rational (apparently rational actions) occur when the person 
has altered consciousness.70  One cannot generalize to all 
human behavior from genuinely deviant cases or cases in which 
a known abnormality is present.  A model of action (or, we 
should say, non-action) built on sleepwalking, for example, is 
hardly a threat to orthodox notions of individual responsibility. 
There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that 
laboratory manipulations of unsuspecting subjects can cause 
the subjects to believe that their intentions were producing 
action when this was not the case.71  That subjects can be 
cleverly misled by experimental manipulations hardly indicates 
that intentions generally play no role in explaining our 
behavior.  Self-deception under laboratory conditions of deceit 
does not entail that intentions generally do not causally explain 
action. 
Finally, there is accumulating evidence that various 
 69. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 
1641–52 (1994) (arguing that clouded consciousness should be treated as an 
affirmative defense); see also Bernard Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. 
Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661 (1994) (arguing that human activity with 
clouded consciousness is action). 
 70.  Accord John F. Kihlstrom, The Automaticity Juggernaut—or, Are We 
Automatons After All?, in  ARE WE FREE? PSYCHOLOGY AND FREE WILL 155-
173 (John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister eds. 2008) 
(reviewing the literature of and the explanation for the claim that virtually all 
behavior is automatic and concluding that the experimental literature on 
automatic behavior does not support such a sweeping assertion). 
 71. See John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the 
Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra 
note 52, at 37, 51–54 (2005) (reviewing the evidence and concluding that the 
“will” is not primarily responsible for action). 
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psychological processes have their biological substrates in 
localized regions of the brain.  We have long known that many 
behavioral activities are biologically based in highly specific 
regions.  For example, the ability to recognize faces is highly 
localized in a region of the temporal lobe of the right 
hemisphere referred to as the “fusiform face area.”  Should this 
area become lesioned, the subject loses the ability to recognize 
faces, a condition called prosopagnosia.72  Now, however, 
functional neuroimaging techniques permit the exploration of 
brain activity during more complicated psychological processes 
and can identify biological substrates for the processes.  I have 
already discussed the example of brain regions associated with 
decisions to purchase an object.73  For another example, a 
recent study demonstrated that investigators could determine 
from the region of brain activity which mental process—adding 
or subtracting—a subject had covertly intended to, but had not 
yet, performed.74 
The localization evidence is immensely interesting and 
suggestive, but it does not indicate that mental states play no 
role in causally explaining behavior.  There must be a biological 
substrate in the brain for all human behavior.  If your brain is 
dead, you are dead and not behaving at all.  Nor is it surprising 
that particular regions of the brain are associated with 
particular psychological processes.  For example, a leading, 
albeit controversial, theory of how the mind works suggests 
that it is composed of different systems that perform different 
functions.75  Although we do not know how the brain enables 
 72. James W. Tanaka, Object Categorization, Expertise, and Neural 
Plasticity, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III 877, 883 (Michael S. 
Gazzaniga ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
 73. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 74. John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human 
Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323, 323–28 (2007). It is important to recognize 
that the brain activity accurately predicted only which type of process the 
subject had covertly formed the intention to perform.  It did not identify the 
specific content of the intention, such as which two numbers the subject 
intended to add or subtract.  Despite the enormous advances in cognitive 
neuroscience, we do not know how to read minds using neuroimaging or any 
other technique. Cf., Martha J. Farah, Bioethical Issues in the Cognitive 
Neurosciences, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra note 72, at 1309, 
1309–10 (referring to the ability to identify traits and states as “a crude form 
of mindreading”). 
 75. See, e.g., JERRY A. FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF MIND (1983) 
(providing a strict modular theory). 
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the mind, it makes sense to assume that specific psychological 
processes would have brain substrates specific to each 
individual process.  Based on what we already know about 
localization and on the reasonable assumption that it would be 
inefficient if all regions of the brain needed equal activation to 
support all psychological processes, localization is most likely to 
be true.  Even if all this is correct, however, it does not follow 
that mental states do no causal explanatory work.  It 
demonstrates at most that the neural network substrates for 
specific mental functions may be located in specific regions of 
the brain. 
What is needed to support NAT is a general and direct 
demonstration that causal intentionality is an illusion tout 
court, but no such general demonstration has yet been 
produced by scientific study.  The most interesting evidence has 
arisen from studies done by neuroscientist, Benjamin Libet,76 
which have generated an immense amount of comment.77  
Indeed, many claim that Libet’s work is the first direct 
neurophysiological evidence of NAT.78  Libet’s exceptionally 
creative and careful studies demonstrate that measurable 
electrical brain activity associated with intentional actions 
occurs in the relevant motor area of the brain about 550 
milliseconds before the subject actually acts and about 350-400 
milliseconds before the subject is consciously aware of the 
intention to act. 
Let us assume, with cautious reservations,79 the basic 
scientific methodological validity of these studies.80  The crucial 
question then becomes whether the interpretation of these 
 76. Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will, in THE VOLITIONAL BRAIN: 
TOWARDS A NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL 47 (Benjamin Libet et al. eds., 
1999) (summarizing the findings and speculating about their implications). 
 77. WEGNER, supra note 51, at 54–55 (characterizing the recounting of 
Libet’s results as a “cottage industry” and noting the large and contentious 
body of commentary). 
 78. William P. Banks & Susan Pockett, Benjamin Libet’s Work on the 
Neuroscience of Free Will, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 
657, 658 (Max Velmans & Susan Schneider eds., 2007). 
 79. See, e.g., HENRIK WALTER, NEUROPHILOSOPHY OF FREE WILL: FROM 
LIBERTARIAN ILLUSIONS TO A CONCEPT OF NATURAL AUTONOMY 250–252 
(Cynthia Klor trans., 2001); Jing Zhu, Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative 
Interpretation of Libet’s Experiment, J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., Nov. 2003, at 
61, 61–77. 
 80. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 659–662 (concluding after a 
careful review of possible artifacts that “[R]eadiness potentials do start before 
the subject consciously ‘decides’ to move.”). 
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findings as supporting NAT is valid.  It does not follow from 
this temporal ordering that conscious intentionality does no 
causal work.  It simply demonstrates that non-conscious brain 
events precede conscious experience.  This seems precisely 
what one would expect of the mind-brain.  Electrical impulses 
move quickly among neurons, but some lag between brain 
activity and conscious experience seems unsurprising.  Once 
again, if the brain is dead, the person is dead.  Prior electrical 
activity does not mean that intentionality played no causal role.  
Electrical activity in the brain is precisely that: electrical 
activity in the brain and not a mental state such as a decision 
or an intention.  A readiness potential is not a decision.81   
Moreover, Libet does not carefully distinguish between 
urges or wants on the one hand and decisions and intentions on 
the other.82  Indeed, Alfred Mele argues that the experimental 
evidence is much more consistent with the readiness potential 
being associated with an urge rather than with an intention or 
a decision. 83  A perfectly plausible reading of Libet’s work is 
that various non-conscious causal variables, including non-
conscious urges, precede action—who would have thought 
otherwise?—but intentionality is nonetheless necessary for 
action. 
Libet also suggests that people can “veto” the act during 
the delay between becoming aware of the intention and 
performing the intended action, which he surprisingly 
conceives of as an undetermined act.  Other researchers appear 
to have localized the part of the brain that is the substrate for 
this activity of vetoing.84  But, in addition to the implausibility 
of the veto being undetermined,85 the conceptual foundations of 
the interpretation that the subjects were exercising a genuine 
veto are shaky at best.86  This suggestion undermines the claim 
that the brain is doing all the work because it is an agent’s 
 81. See ALFRED R. MELE, FREE WILL AND LUCK 30–46 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 33; see also M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 228–31 (2003) (criticizing Libet’s account of 
action). 
 83. MELE, supra note 81, at 33, 40. 
 84. See Marcel Brass & Patrick Haggard, To Do or Not to Do: The Neural 
Signature of Self-Control, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9141, 9144 (2007) (identifying 
the part of the brain that is activated when the “veto” is exercised). 
 85. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 667. 
 86. MELE, supra note 81, at 34–35. 
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mental state, a newly formed intention to veto, that causes the 
agent not to perform the act.  In short, Libet’s work 
presupposes agency at every step in the process. 
Finally, Libet’s task involved “random” finger movements 
that involved no deliberation whatsoever and no rational 
motivation for the specific movements involved.87  This is a far 
cry from the behavioral concerns of the criminal law or 
morality, which address intentional conduct in contexts when 
there is always good reason to refrain from harming another or 
to act beneficently.  In fact, it is at present an open question 
whether Libet’s paradigm is representative of intentional 
actions in general because Libet used such trivial behavior.88 
Libet’s work is fascinating, but it does not prove that 
humans are generally not conscious, intentional agents or 
capable of employing their conscious intentionality when they 
have good reason to do so.89  Even if the work is 
methodologically valid, various conceptual and interpretive 
arguments undermine the claim that Libet has demonstrated 
that NAT is true. 
In short, despite the often astonishing findings and 
impressive advances in neuroscience and allied disciplines, 
there is no compelling evidence yet that NAT is generally true.  
Future discoveries may undermine this conclusion, however, so 
in the next subsection I turn to the implications of NAT. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF NAT 
NAT provides no guidance about what people should do 
next and, in any event, degenerates into self-referential 
incoherence.  Suppose that you were convinced by the 
mechanistic view that you were not an intentional, rational 
agent after all.  (Of course, the notion of being “convinced” 
would be an illusion, too.90  Being convinced means that you 
 87. Participating in the study and cooperating with the investigator can 
be rationally motivated, of course.  But the experimental task was to move 
one’s finger randomly, for no good reason. 
 88. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 662–63. 
 89. See Jerry Fodor, Making the Connection, TIMES LITERARY 
SUPPLEMENT, May 17, 2002, at 4 (arguing that the new neuroscience rarely 
has much to contribute when the phenomenon in question is complex social 
behavior). 
 90. See Daniel C. Dennett, Calling in the Cartesian Loans, 27 BEHAV. 
BRAIN SCI. 661, 661 (2004) (wondering, in response to Professor Wegner, who 
is this “we” that inhabits the brain). 
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On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same 
internal contradiction just explored.  What is the nature of the 
“agent” that is discovering the laws governing how incentives 
shape behavior?  Could understanding and providing incentives 
via social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal 
interpretations of what the brain has already done?  How do 
“we” “decide” which behaviors to reward or punish?  What role 
does “reason”—a property of thought and agents, not a property 
of brains—play in this “decision”? Once again, the NAT account 
seems to swallow itself.  Moreover, NAT proponents of 
consequentialism could hardly complain about those who refuse 
to “accept” what the proponents think rationality requires.  The 
allegedly misguided people who resist are simply the victims of 
their automatic brain states. They cannot be expected 
intentionally to use their capacity for reason to accept what the 
consequentialists believe reason demands.  Indeed, the 
consequentialist’s belief is also an illusory mental state or it 
exists but plays no role in explaining behavior. 
were persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is 
not persuaded by anything.  It is simply neurophysically 
transformed.)  What should you do now?  You know that it is an 
illusion to think that your deliberations and intentions have 
any causal efficacy in the world.  (Again, what does it mean 
according to the purely mechanistic view to “know” something?  
But enough.)  You also know, however, that you experience 
sensations such as pleasure and pain and that you care about 
what happens to you and to the world.  You cannot just sit 
quietly and wait for your neurons to fire.  You cannot wait for 
determinism to happen.  You must, and will of course, 
deliberate and act. 
If one still thought that NAT were correct and that 
standard notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert are 
therefore impossible, one might nevertheless continue to 
believe that the law would not necessarily have to give up the 
concept of incentives.  Through poorly-understood automatic 
processes, it is possible that various potential rewards and 
punishments would shape behavior even if they did not do so as 
premises in practical reasoning.  Such an account would be 
consistent with “black box” accounts of economic incentives.  
For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of 
human behavior entails complete consequentialism, such a 
conclusion might not be unwelcome. 
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Even if our mental states play no genuinely causal role 
(about which, once again, we will never be certain until we 
solve the mind-body problem) human beings will find it almost 
impossible not to treat themselves as rational, intentional 
agents unless there are major changes in the way our brains 
work. Moreover, if one uses the truth of pure mechanism as a 
premise in deciding what to do, this premise yields no 
particular moral, legal or political conclusions.  It will provide 
no guide to how one should live or how one should respond to 
the truth of NAT. 
D. REASONS TO REJECT NAT 
Answers to the possibility of NAT are rooted in common 
sense, a plausible theory of mind, and practical necessity.  
Virtually every neurologically intact person consistently has 
the experience of first person agency, the experience that one’s 
intentions flow from one’s desires and beliefs and result in 
action.  Indeed, this folk-psychological experience is so central 
to human life and so apparently explanatory that it is difficult 
to imagine giving it up or a good reason to do so, even if it were 
possible to give it up.  As the eminent philosopher of mind, 
Jerry Fodor, has written: 
[I]f commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse, that 
would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in 
the history of our species; if we’re that wrong about the mind, then 
that’s the wrongest we’ve ever been about anything.  The collapse of 
the supernatural, for example, didn’t compare. . . . Nothing except, 
perhaps, our commonsense physics . . . comes as near our cognitive 
core as intentional explanation does.  We’ll be in deep, deep trouble if 
we have to give it up. . . . 
. . . But be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right.91 
Moreover, the folk-psychological theory has much 
explanatory power and is capable of scientific investigation.92  
Finally, it is hard to imagine the nature of a scientific study 
that would prove conclusively to creatures that have created 
 91. JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, at xii (1987). 
 92. See, e.g., BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: 
FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (2004) (providing a 
full theoretical account and empirical support).  There is also growing 
recognition within psychology that “mental-state inference is one of the most 
fundamental tools of social cognition.”  Bertram F. Malle, Folk Theory of Mind: 
Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition, in THE NEW 
UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 52, at 225, 229. 
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that study and will assess it with mental states that mental 
states do no work. 
The plausible theory of mind that might support such 
explanations is thoroughly material, but non-reductive and 
non-dualist.  It hypothesizes that all mental and behavioral 
activity is the causal product of lawful physical events in the 
brain, that mental states are real, that they are caused by 
lower level biological processes in the brain, that they are 
realized in the brain—the mind-brain—but not at the level of 
neurons, and that mental states can be causally efficacious.93 
Moreover, there is a perfectly plausible evolutionary story 
about why folk psychology is causally explanatory and why 
human beings need rules such as those provided by law.  We 
have evolved to be self-conscious creatures that act for reasons.  
Practical reason is inescapable for creatures like ourselves who 
inevitably care about the ends they pursue and about what 
reason they have to act in one way rather than another.94  
Because we are social creatures whose interactions are not 
governed primarily by innate repertoires, it is inevitable that 
rules will be necessary to help order our interactions in any 
minimally complex social group.95  As a profoundly social 
species, it seems apparent that our ancestors would have been 
much less successful, and therefore much less likely to be our 
ancestors, if they were unable to understand the intentions of 
others, not sure they could convert their intentions into action, 
and were not also equipped with powerful assumptions that 
that stranger coming over the hill is equipped with the same 
capacity for harmful intentions as they are.96  The ubiquitous 
 93. See, e.g., Searle, supra note 6, at 113–14 (terming his position 
“biological naturalism” about consciousness). 
 94. BOK, supra note 31, at 75–91, 129–31, 146–51 (1998). 
 95. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: 
MORALITY, RULES AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 11–25 (2001) (explaining why 
rules are necessary in a complex society and contrasting their account with 
H.L.A. Hart’s theory). 
 96. See Justin N. Wood et al., The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed 
Action in Nonhuman Primates, 317 SCIENCE 1402, 1405 (2007) (demonstrating 
that the ability to understand the intentions of other creatures evolved in 
primates 40 million years ago); see also Esther Herrmann et al., Humans Have 
Developed Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis, 317 SCIENCE 1360 (2007) (comparing chimpanzees and 
orangutans to two-and-a-half-year-old humans and discovering that they have 
approximately equal cognitive skills concerning the physical world, but that 
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and centrality of mental states suggests that they are very 
evolutionarily expensive if they play no causal role in peoples’ 
lives. 
Human beings have developed extraordinarily diverse 
ways of living together, but a ubiquitousness feature of all 
societies is that they are governed by rules addressed to beings 
capable of following those rules.  As Fodor notes, one of the 
most basic, well-justified assumptions about human nature is 
that we are consciously intentional creatures that are capable 
of a great deal of rationality.  At the very least, we remain 
entitled to presume that conscious intentions are causal and to 
place the burden of persuasion at a very high level on those 
who wish to substitute another account. 
In sum, the allegedly disappearing person is fully visible, 
well, and continues to act for good reasons, including the 
reasons not yet to accept NAT. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is an avalanche of new neuroscience in both 
scientific journals and the popular media. The legal and social 
implications of this work seem very troublesome.  As a special 
report on neuroscience in The Economist warned, “Genetics 
may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society 
homogeneous, and gut the concept of human nature.  But 
neuroscience could do all of these things first.”97  In a more 
recent editorial, the same newspaper direly reported that 
“modern neuroscience is eroding the idea of free will.”98  The 
editorial argued that free will is necessary for responsibility 
and that “science will shrink the space in which free will can 
operate by slowly exposing the mechanism of decision 
making.”99 
For the reasons I have given, I believe that these warnings 
are not conceptually and empirically justified, but they clearly 
represent a particular view that the new neuroscience 
engenders.  Because agency and responsibility are so central to 
our interpersonal and moral lives, so central to our conception 
of ourselves, and so tied to notions of dignity and autonomy, I 
humans have superior cognitive skills for understanding social interaction). 
 97. Open Your Mind; The Ethics of Brain Science, ECONOMIST, May 25, 
2002, at 77, 77. 
 98. Free to Choose?, supra note 4, at 16. 
 99. Id. 
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hope that we will always have reason to reject the view that we 
are not agents and responsibility is impossible. At present, 
however, we are justified in believing that we are agents and 
can be responsible. 
 
